 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
|
|
Since the time we have known it the primary preoccupation of linguistics
has been the analysis of the structural properties of language. It generally
engaged itself either with the analysis of full-blown words or with the
set of procedures that clarify the pairing of lexicon with a set of syntactic
rules. In the former case, the processes of segmentation and classification
eventually lead to postulating roots and stems that nobody uses; the rules
that formed words from these roots were often accompanied by a long list
of exceptions. In the latter case, the lexicon-syntax pairing could either
be seen computed in terms of a set of rules or in terms of connectionism
(Giersson and Losonsky 1996: 487). A rule-based system operates on symbols
in terms of rewrite rules whereas a connectionist model is said to be rooted
in neural networks.
Even when, from time to time, some efforts were made to locate language
in its social context, structuralist considerations continued to dominate
the enterprise.The so-called sociolinguistic and ethnographic analysis
remained confined to either co relational analysis of social and linguistic
variables or to the treatment of variable communicative practices across
different societies. For most of them, speech community remained a rather vaguely
|
|
defined cultural construct that enjoyed some kind of socio-political
neutrality, emerging as it were, as naturally as 'leaves come to a tree'
(cf. Keats) which is perhaps not even entirely true of poetry. They certainly
noticed that there was generally a significant correlation between socio-economic
hierarchies on the one hand and celebration or stigmatisation of linguistic
features on the other. Yet they refused to see that this differential distribution
of prestige and power - be it social, economic or linguistic was actually
historically constituted and that it was a manifestation of socio-political
manipulation of a select-few. What is generally subsumed under the colourful
rubric of sociolinguistic variability is essentially the result of the carefully
structured power-relations in society. After all, in the name of equality
of languages at the systemic level, we simply compare standard languages
with Non-Standard Negro English or dehaatii or gavaanruu bhaashaa (rustic
language or the language of the idiots). I do not wish to, in any way, underestimate
the immense contributions of the structural enterprise. I simply wish to
make a new beginning by saying: Have we been asking the right question?
That as you know is half the battle in science. |
As I take you through a brief sketch of my biographical struggle with
trying to understand the nature and complexity of language, I will try to
show how we have consistently tried to create and sustain a disjunction
between language and society, ignoring the power-relations that significantly
influence their mutual dependency and structuring. I think this exercise
has prevented linguistics from playing an important role in repairing the
human condition as it obtains today. As I develop this critique, I will
also briefly spell out the outlines of an alternative framework. In the
second lecture, I will try to examine the implications of this framework
for the future agenda of linguistics with special reference to the areas
in which CIIL is likely to play a pioneering role in the near future. |
When I joined the Department of Linguistics, University of Delhi, in 1969
as a Diploma student, I was in for certain surprises. For example, I realized
that linguistics had nothing to do with English language and literature
although a greater part of our knowledge of linguistics came through English
and examples from English. More seriously, I was told that a linguist does
not have to know many languages. The fact that I knew four and the best
of American linguists perhaps knew only one was largely inconsequential.
It seemed obvious to me then and still makes some sense to me. But it is
no longer an unproblematic issue. We need to examine the implications of
some of our most powerful theories of language coming from predominantly
monolingual contexts and from monolingual linguists or in some cases relatively
balanced bilingual linguists. It is now widely recognized that multilinguality
is a natural human condition; it is monolingualism, which may be treated
as an exception. Effortless multilingual first language(s) acquisition remains
a mystery for the science of language - linguistically, psychologically
and socially. The ways in which languages are kept separate from each other
and the ways in which they simultaneously flow into each other are not sufficiently
well understood. If we wish to hold on to the contemporary hypotheses about
the autonomy of language, poverty of stimulus, speed of acquisition, parameter
setting and the principles of economy and elegance all operating independent
of the social context, the pieces constituting our multilinguality may not
fall into place. Any theory of language, which does not keep human multilinguality
at the centre of its investigations, is bound to be inadequate. |
Another thing that struck me at that time and has stayed with me since
is what, for want of a better expression, I call data and data analysis
asymmetry. I realized that we were dealing with ordinary sounds, words and
sentences - sentences as innocent as 'Flying planes can be dangerous' or
'John is easy to please' versus 'John is eager to please', set of words
as simple as 'cats, dogs and buses' and sounds as unremarkable as 'p, ph,
b and bh'. As compared to other sciences, natural or social, language data
was easily accessible, right in your head or at best from a friend next
door, but linguistic analysis was very complex and abstract. Even today,
I regard the rigour and sophistication of its abstract analysis as one of
the greatest strengths of the science of language. Of course, it makes the
task of learning linguistics rather difficult. All of you would recollect
the struggle we went through to come to terms with the concepts of say linguistic
sign, complementary and contrastive distribution or syntagmatic and paradigmatic
relations. It takes a while before one can really appreciate that some languages
have only /p/, some have 'p' and 'ph', in complementary distribution while
some have them in contrastive distribution. We know how difficult it is
to put across this abstract conceptual machinery to our students. In fact,
the essential hypotheses, behaviourist or cognitive, have really not changed
during the last 50 years, but the analytical machinery has become increasingly
abstract so that many of us begin to lose interest by the time we get to
c-command, move-alpha, wh-movement, projection principles, binding theory
and the like. There can be no quarrel with the abstractness of analysis;
that is the way science progresses. In fact, so far the basic linguistic
competence of a 3 year old is concerned, I wonder what other hypothesis
than innateness can we give, tempered, if need be, with a hint of constructive
interactionism between the mind and the environment. However, it is not
clear to me to what extent the analytical machinery that is becoming increasingly
abstract can help us to focus on the kind of questions we are trying to
raise in these lectures - essentially the questions concerning the disjunction
between language and society. This is certainly not a call for a theory
that is more instrumentally driven and puts a premium on relevance rather
than on pure pursuit of knowledge. But this does raise the question of human
condition and the centrality of language in it and the question of how shall
we address that condition. I hope you appreciate the persistent paradox
I am trying to underscore. Language needs to be defined primarily in terms
of multilinguality located essentially in the differential power structures
in society; but the science of language has consistently been concerned
with developing an increasingly abstract machinery to characterize the structure
of language as a phenomenon largely isolated from society. There must be
some ways in which multilinguals may be resolving Quine's (1960) Gavagai
problem in their complex repertoire, they obviously have ways of demarcating
the separate ontological status of 'rabbit' and 'rabbitness' as they travel
across languages constantly translating one into the other. |
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
