A
NOTE ON THE MEANINGS OF 'FORM'*
Where to draw the line is always a ticklish question;
whether to draw a line at all is even more so. One such pair of questions that is currently
facing philosophers (ever since they got interested in looking for
the linguistic foundations of their enterprise) and more recently,
linguists (ever since they got interested in looking for the philosophical,
foundations of their job) is the pair that concerns the analysis of
the meanings of a word/term and of a sentence/statement.
The philosopher’s worry is lest his activity degenerate into
the giving of “tedious and inaccurate supplements to [H.W.Fowler’s]
Modern English Usage, instead of philosophical discussion of
a ‘way of using a word’ which could be found in many languages” (Geach1957:
p. 16). The linguist is equally
anxious that his concern for the analysis of meaning does not degenerate
into amateurish philosophizing. It
is far from the intention of this note to offer (or even suggest)
answers to the pair of questions that one could ask about this particular
boundary line. It has set
itself a much more modest job to set the philosopher right about his
notion of what a linguist (a lexicographer, to be more specific) is
expected by his fellow professional (and I mean processionals and
not rather in writing the right half of a dictionary entry.
It is always helpful to know just how green the grass on the
other side is.
In writing the right half of a dictionary
entry the lexicographer could be doing one or more of several things:
he could offer illustrative examples, he could frame stage directions
for or descriptions of the use of the term, he could list some equivalent
expressions that can readily be substituted, and, finally, he could
formulate a definition that reports on the existing interpretation. These four alternatives, namely, examples,
usage notes, ready equivalents, and reportive definitions can be regarded
both as mutually complementary and as mutually substitutive. Thus while Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary (1969) says about the word “yes. . . . adv”
that it is “ used as a function
word to express assent or agreement [are you ready? Yes, I am]”
(Usage note followed by an example)
and—
“used as a function word to indicate
uncertainty or polite
interest or attentiveness”
(usage note) among other things, The
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (5th edition,
1964) has the following to say about “yes particle equivalent to affirmative
sentence”—
“The answer to your question is affirmative,
it is as you say or as I have said, your request or command will be
complied with, the statement made or course intended is correct or
satisfactory”
(reportive
definitions as also some ready equivalents) and—
“(in
answer to summons or address). I
am here, I hear or am attending to you, (yes? What more have you to
say?)”note, ready equivalent, and example) among other things.
Out of these four there is no danger
that the giving of examples or ready equivalents will ever be confused
with any kind of philosophical activity.
The questions about the drawing of boundary lines (whether,
where) arise only in the case of reportive definitions and usage notes,
and not with the other two.
Where does a competently formulated
reprotive definition in a dictionary end and a piece of conceptual
analysis begin? And where
does a competently framed usage note in a dictionary end and a piece
of usage analysis, i.e. analysis of the conditions for the felicitous
use of an expressions begin? In this note we shall confine our attention
to the former pair. (Reportive
definitions by linguists need not be illustrated from actual dictionaries,
they could also be drawn from pieces of meaning analysis carried out
by linguists.) Here is a sample of linguists’ efforts:
(i)
walk . . v. . (Of men)
progress by advancing each foot alternately never having both off ground at once. . (of animals
go with slowest gait corresponding to human walk . . (from The
Concise Oxford Dictionary.)
(ii)
run . .v. . (Of men)
progress by advancing each foot alternately never having both on ground
at once . . (of animals) go at quicker than walking pace, amble, trot,
canter, gallop, etc. (from the same source; amble), trot, etc. are
not ready equivalents, but species of running).
(iii)
cousin one’s consanguineal of the higher-than-first degree
of collaterality (source: recent discussions in anthropological linguistics1)
While
none of these terms are of the kind that is of philosophical interest,
their definitions
are
certainly analytical in character.
Comparing the definitions of walk and run, for example, one
can easily separate the common genus and the differtiating characteristics. Here are some verbs that are likely to be of philosophical interest
(Fillmore 1969) :
(iv)
accuse say as a judge to the addressee that someone is responsible
for something presupposed to be bad:
A (the
(judge) credited B (the one accused) of X (something bad)
credit think
as a judge that someone is responsible for something presupposed to be good:
(v)
A (the judge) credited B (the one credited) with X (something good).
In the same vein one can define excuse,
exonerate, and forgive so as to distinguish between them. It is true that the author of the definitions
cited is a linguist who acknowledges his debt to the philosopher Austin.
The reason for assembling this sample
is to suggest that the difference between the lexicographer’s reportive
definitions and usage notes and the philosopher’s conceptual analysis
and felicity condition may not lie in that the linguist and the philosopher
are performing analyses different in kind or in that the two are analyzing
entities of different kinds. Rather
the two have different ends in view—the linguist is intent on bringing
out what is characteristic of a given language, the philosopher is
interested in what is common to a large number of languages if not
so all of them regardless of their difference from one another.
Let us now turn our attention to the
noun form in English. Latin
forma, Greek morphe.
In so doing we shall ignore what is likely to turn out to be
parochial in one way or the other.
The sense of form ‘class of school pupils in the same
year’ is confined to British secondary schools (especially grammar
and public schools) and some American private schools. The sense ‘body of printed matter secured for
printing in one impression’ is confined to the printer’s trade.
The sense ‘resting place of a hare’
is not likely to be matched in other European languages. Even after these and other exclusions, the
noun is still left with many senses.
I propose to arrange and define these senses.
The arrangement has no claim to being historical, though sense
I is probably the oldest. The
definitions will bring out the significance of the arrangement-there
seems most of these senses the noun form is traditionally opposed
to some other noun—thus, the pairs form—matter and form—spirit
point to quite different senses.
We shall not say anything at this stage about the philosopher’s
uses of the noun form.
(1) Visible, distant aspect such as shape, size, arrangement
of parts, colour, light- and-shade,
surface texture as opposed to body, tactile, proximate aspect such
as weight, feel, inner texture.
Example: He has a well-proportioned
face and form. The demon took
the form of a tiger. It is without shape or form.
(2) Visible linear aspect such as shape, size, arrangement of
parts as opposed to the rest of the visible aspect such
as colour, light-and-shade, surface texture.
Example: I saw a dark form moving in the mist.
Can you see the form of an elephant in those clouds?
(3) Shape and arrangement of parts, formal cause (pattern, structure,
design, scheme) underlying
a concrete object, especially a made object, or a concrete piece of
activity as opposed to material, substance, matter,
that which is shaped and arranged, material cause.
Example: Gold was
imported in the form of bars and ornaments.
Both the arguments have the same logical form, though, at the
material level one is about the morality of Socrates and the other
is about lying Cretans. A letter of introduction was written in due
form. Ancient forms are observed
at the coronation. The same subject-matter can be offered in different
forms I brought some blank entry forms (American: I brought some entry
blanks).
(1)
Palpable effect of a formal cause, actual manifestation with its shape,
arrangement of parts, even material as opposed to the underlying
final cause (function, purpose, intent, content, meaning) and/or efficient
cause (spirit, energy).
Example: Ice and steam are both forms of water. The indefinite article in French has three
forms: le, la, les. In synonymy
different forms have the same meaning.
Don’t do it for form’s sake: you must mean it. Tax evasion is a form of dishonesty. Democracy is a form of government; parliamentary democracy is a
form of democracy. Forms of
worship. Asking you to stay
for dinner is common form among them; don’t take such an invitation
too seriously. This is a subtle form of insult. Revenge has taken this strange form. It is good form and bad form to act in this
manner.
In all the four senses of form
presented so far form is opposed to something else that is known less
readily, that is less immediately accessible. In the fourth sense
the less accessible is also the more abstract.
Also there are certain relationships between the senses.
The second sense can be seen as the first sense specialized
in one direction. The third
sense can be seen as the second generalized beyond the visual domain.
(5)
That which yields or informs the formal and material effect, ability
to perform, essence, spirit, idea, life as opposed to matter, body,
the actual manifestation.
Examples: The horse/athlete
is in form/is out of form/has lost his form.
He was in great form—the very life of
the party. His speech was
in the form of a bitter attack. (Cf. His attack was in the form of a bitter
speech: with form-4.)
The movements from the third sense
to the fourth and from the fourth to the fifth can be set out as follows:
more
concrete effect, manifestation 4 5’
less
abstract
:
material cause
3’ :
:
:
formal cause
3 :
:
:
: :
less
concrete efficient
and/or : :
more
abstract final
cause 4’ 5
Note:
3, 4, 5 stand for sense 3, 4, 5 and 3’ 4’ 5’ and 3’ 4’ 5’ for the
respective opposite terms—material, function/spirit, and matter.
This is typical example of polysemy
of the kind that does not involve openness of concept or essential
contestation. While particular
pairs, sense I and sense 2, are likely to turn up in the same word
or phrase in other languages, there is something partochial about
the whole wet of the five senses.
What about each of the opposed pairs of senses, say I and 1’,
3 and 3’? They are less parochial and so likely to be found in a large
variety of languages. Note
that the English noun shape has senses similar to 2 (dim shapes
in the mist), 3 (the shape of things to come), and 4 (bribery in any
form or shape).
One additional observation needs to
be made at this point about the third sense—formal cause underlying
a concrete object or piece of activity as opposed to its material
cause. In this formulation of sense 3 we have emphasized’
how form is opposed to substance or material. In sense 3 form acts, at the same time, as
a cover term for two abstractions—structure and system. Let us say that form appears in two modes—the conjunctive mode in
which form consists in the structural or constitutive relations between
part and part and between part and whole; and he disjunctive mode
in which form consists in the systematic or substitutive relations
between instance and instance and between instance and norm.
Form in the conjunctive mode or structural form is based on
and-relationships—part and part within a whole. Form in the disjunctive mode or systematic form is based on or relationships—norm
underlying this instance or that, position occupied by this element
or that. In justification
of this apparent digression I have to point out that some of the disputes
at least about form stem form its hasty identification with just one
or the other of these two modes.
For example, those who emphasize the uniqueness of a work of
art speak of form in art exclusively in the conjunctive mode, others
would be willing to grant the possibility of speaking of form in art
also in the disjunctive mode. They
will tolerate, even welcome, questions such as ‘Bu couldn’t the poet
have used this other word in place of the one he has actually
used? And if he hasn’t, why
hasn’t he? Again, when we speak of the form of any language, we may
mean form in the disjunctive mode or form in the conjunctive mode
depending on whether we look upon language as activity (energeia)
or as artifact (ergon). The form of language as an activity will be
disjunctive, the form of language as an artifact will be conjunctive. Similar could be made in respect of the form
of other social institutions.
Let us now turn to the senses of the
noun form as a philosophical term and relate them to the ordinary
usage senses presented so far. (Ordinary usage sense 5 probably originated
use (iii) out of the philosophical uses set out below.)
(i)
Plato (in this sense the term idea is more common; this use
of the term in presenting Plato’s ideas is Medieval): universal essence,
pattern regarded as a real transcendent entity of which existing things
are imperfect representations. (Compare
form—5.)
(ii)
Aristotle: formal cause. (Compare form-3.)
(iii)
Medieval Scholastic: that which makes anything a determinate kind
of being, essence. (Compare
(form—5. This sense has roots in certain Aristotelian
doctrines.)
(iv)
Francis Bacon: conditions for the existence of any given nature or
quality by knowing which the latter would be produced. (Compare form-3.
and form-5.)
(v)
Immanuel Kant: one of the two a-priori forms of intuition (i.e. subjective
factors of knowledge) that constitute the conditions of the possibility
of experience (i.e. that mould reality as given by the senses and
makes it possible to perceive and know objects), namely, space and
time. (Compare form-3. and form-4. Perhaps one can say that Kant’s sense arises
out of an attempt to see certain formal causes as efficient causes. Form in ‘forms of intuition’ probably
form-4.
When Ludwig Witgenstein speaks of the form of life lebensforme
he is probably using form in a sense intermediate between ordinary
usages senses 3 (formal cause) and 4 (actual manifestation). Perhaps one can say that he sees the form-3 of the manifestation
as a reflection of the form-3 of the intent or energy behind the manifestation.
Since persons
discussing art and aesthetic qualities use the term form with
particular fondness, it will be useful to find uses for the five senses
of form in such contexts.
(1) In discussing sculpture, architecture, and
their extra-artistic analogues, form-1 and its opposite could be distinguished.
Thus, the beauty of sculpture is both beauty of form and beauty
of body.
(2) In discussing
painting and the graphic arts, dance, and their extra-artistic analogues,
form-2 and its opposite could be distinguished. Thus, a painting may evince a sense of form
but not a sense of colour or light-and-shade or surface-texture.
(3) In discussing
any art, one can say that the material of art becomes its medium by
being given a form-3 in the first instance.
It is this form that we miss when speak of formlessness in
relation to works of art or their extra-artistic analogues.
(4) This form-3
has an underlying function, content or spirit. Here form-4 is being attended to.
(5) In the final
analysis, the form of a work of art is the shaping of the material
, the shaping of the content, and the essence (form-5) responsible
for its existence. In other
words, a work of art is a form of life.
Style could
be understood as form (in senses 3, 4, 5) in relation to the
material and the medium of a work of art.
When we speak of forms of literature (or of poetry or of prose
fiction or of music) we are using form in senses 4 and 5-thus
tragedy is a form fiction and a given piece of fiction may be manifestation
of the tragic form.
I trust that this linguistic analysis of the meaning of the English noun form is
of more than parochial interest, i.e. it holds some interest for the
philosophical analysis of the meaning of the term form in the Western
philosophical tradition. (The
current Indian use of nouns like
rūpa, āk ¤ ti as loan translations of the English noun form is of course
more an offshoot of this tradition than any continuation of the classical
Indian tradition. Specially,
I recommended rūpa,
ākrti, ākāra, and sattva respectively
for ordinary usage.
References
Fillmore, Charles J. 1969. Verbs of judging: An Exercise in semantic description. Papers in linguistics 1 : I (July) Reptd. in:
Fillmore and Langendoen (ed.) 1971 : 272-89. French tr. : Verbs de
judgement . Languages
no. 17.56-72 (March, 1970).
Fillmore; Lngendoen, D. Terence (ed.) 1971. Studies in
Linguistic Semantics. New
york: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Fowler, F. G; Fowler, H. W. 1925. The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current
English. 2nd edition.
Oxford: The clarendon P (1st ed., 1917)
Fowler, H. W.; Fowler, F.H. 1964. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English.
5th ed. Oxford: Clarendon P. (1st ed.,
1911.)
Geach, Peter. 1957. Mental acts. London: Rutledge &
Kegan Paul.
Ptanakar, R.B. 1974. Saundaryamīmāiṁsā.
Bombay: Aesthetic Society; Mouj. (In Marathi, ‘Aesthetics’.
Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfied, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co.,
1969.
Deccan College, Poona and
Central Institute of Indian
Ashok R. Kelkar
Language, Mysore
COLOPHON:
This was published in Indian philosophical Quarterly 3:3:325-33,
April 97
NOTES
An earlier version in Marathi read at a symposium on R.
B. Patankar’s Saundaryamīmāiṁsā (1947) at Poona on 22-23 November
1975. I am thankgul to Dr. S. V. Bokil (Fergusson College, Poona) for helpful
comments on both the versions. Patankar’s
discussion (1974: section 112 of form and its Marathi translation
equivalents was the immediate occasion.
1.
A less jargonized but quite adequate reportive definition appears
in The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English (2nd
edition 1925): “ person related to another by decent from one person
through two of his or her children”.
In the usage of some persons the term cousin is further
limited to persons of own or descending generation.
The expression ‘of higher-than-first degree of collaterality’
in the anthropological linguist’s definition can also be paraphrased
as ‘a consanguineal whose parents are not one’s collineal’: his excludes
brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, greatnncles, and
so forth.
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