The
Semiotics of Technical
Names and Terms*
1.
Technical names don’t come singly, they belong to some more
or less loosely organized set, which one terms a technical nomenclature.
Technical terms don’t come singly either; they belong to some more
or less closely organized set, which one terms a technical terminologies.
[There is a vital, if only vaguely recognized, distinction between
names and nomenclatures on hand and terms and terminologies on the
other hand. Perhaps it needs to be pointed out that a technical names
or term may be grammatically verb or an adjective or even words like
the legal whereas or and/or no less than a noun. Of the name-term distinction, more
later.] A given expression, sentence [commercial expressions like
cash on delivery
or first
come first served are actually sentences] or phrase or
word or word element as the case may be, may belong to more than one
nomenclature – an alveolar process is equally the concern of anatomists,
dentists, and phoneticians and hence the technical name belongs to
their respective nomenclature. So also with a technical term like
concentration,
which turns up in chemistry, pharmacy, demography, military science,
and perhaps more essentially in a space. What is more, an expression
that has a technical sense may turn up in ordinary, non-technical
discourse-as when a newspaper reports a concentration of troops on
the border. Certain expression that has a technical sense may turn
up in chemistry, pharmacy, demography, military science, and perhaps
more essentially in the statistical study of the distribution of a
population of entities in a space. What is more, an expression that
has a technical sense may turn up in ordinary, non-technical discourse-as
when a newspaper reports a concentration of troops on the border certain
expressions like live load or carcinoma or tetrahedron always have a technical sense to them: indeed some
of them like gas or phoneme may have been specifically coined for
this purpose. Other may have both technical and non-technical senses
as when a student complains about his loss of concentration, or when
he says, in a sense not intended by the psychoanalyst Adler, that
he suffers from an inferiority complex. (A complex, in the technical
sense, is essentially unconscious.) Some year ago, airlines had a
dispute among themselves on the technical difference between snack
and meal,
otherwise innocuous ordinary expressions. Finally, one may suppose
that pretty or sway always remain
so innocuous. We should now realize that the phrase technical expression is only
a shorthand for `a name or a term used in a technical sense and typically
in a technical context’ Technical sense and technical together constitute
the whole technical manner of using a language. Technical nomenclature
and terminology simply constitute the heart of technical use of language.
They both define and are defined by a field of experience and activity,
a class of entities, a subject matter that is the special concern
of a community of language users, be they dentists or phoneticians
chemists or demographers, cricket-players or chess-players, Hindustani
musicians or Ayurvedic physicians. Out of this intense concern of
the specialist, the community is driven to use language in a technical
manner in talking about its chosen field. Others, that is, those who
are laymen in contrast to the specialist, in the field concerned may
of course borrow some of the technical expressions in the ordinary,
non-technical manner of using language. But the technical expressions
essentially belong with the usage of the community of specialists
in dentistry, chemistry, Muslim law, chess or whatever. (Needless
to say, the technical manner of using language is not the monopoly
if technologists. What is perhaps more important, the natural habitat
of technical expressions is not the reports of committees on nomenclature
or terminology but the live shoptalk of specialists. Indeed new names
or terms are liable to arise and be shaped more of seminar or conference.)
The
upshot of the argument so far is that technicality is an attribute
not so much. Of an expression or even its sense or its context as
of a whole manner of language-wise. This technical manner stands in
contrast to the ordinary manner of language use. The sense of expressions
and syntactic constructions in ordinary language is liable to ambiguity,
fuzziness, redundancies, and other muddles. Ordinary language very
much depends on the good sense of its senders and receivers in muddling
through. Indeed the muddles are occasionally even assets rather than
liabilities-as in dealing with a slow child or a wily opponent. Muddles
are anathema to technical language, which hates to depend on the good
sense of the interlocutors. Technical language would rather depend
on definitions a tetrahedron is regular if all its angles are congruent
to each other, a regular polygon is a polygon that is equilateral
and equiangular, and so on in linked definitions in an organized set
and conventions in law, he includes she; in an arithmetical expression,
inner-brackets take precedence over outer brackets. These definitions
and conventions may be traditional or newly stipulated. Through these
technical language achieves certain tidiness. But it does so at a
price-the field does not remain unlimited as is the case with ordinary
language that can talk of cabbages and kings, rather is it limited
by some specialized concern. It is as if there are as many technical
languages as there are fields. Technical language is a sort of departure
from ordinary language.
But then technical language
is not the only departure from ordinary language. It stands in contrast
to another departure from ordinary language in an opposite direction-that
of poetic language in the broadest sense. Thus we are not looking
upon a dyad so much as a triad-technical, ordinary, and poetic uses
of language. This means that we have to find out in what way the technical
and the ordinary are non-poetic, the ordinary and the poetic are non-technical
and the poetic are non-ordinary. We are ringing changes on the use
of language.
A good opening to the
discussion of the contrast between the non-poetic and the poetic is
provided by Punya Sloka ray΄s discussion of the formation of
prose 91962: 313=1963:138):
‘Let us begin with a dilemma. Language is impossible
if the speaker and the hearer do not agree at all on what forms should
carry what meanings. And yet, language is useless if the speaker and
the hearer could agree completely without recourse to the meaningful
forms between them. So language is usable only insofar as we do not
depend upon it, and yet language is useful only insofar as we do depend
upon it. Fortunately, the absoluteness of the paradox is only a metaphysical
make-believe…But this formulation does serve to highlight a certain
duality in our handling of language…the systematic cultivation of
dependence on language will be defined as poetry and systematic cultivation
of independence from language defined as prose…prose we shall define
as a movement away from [poetry]…’
Actually, on Punya Sloka
Ray’s own showing, prose is not just a movement away from poetry but
also a movement away from ordinary language, which neither cultivates
systematic dependence on language nor cultivates systematic independence
from language. Since, like Molièrés Monsieur Jourdain we all speak
prose, it would be wiser to drop the expression prose altogether.
Again, it is awkward to use the term poetic for a whole
area of which poetry proper is only an extreme example. The term stylized is probably
suited to cover a movement towards a systematic dependence on language.
So we now have: (a) technical
language use: cultivating or moving towards systematic independence
from language and thus permitting translation without any loss of
meaning;(b) ordinary language use:
neither technical nor stylized and thus intermediate in character;(c)
stylized language use:
cultivating or moving towards systematic dependence on language and
thus excluding translation without loss of meaning.
Let us now proceed to
flesh out this skeletal triad. To begin with, we can locate ways in
which the technical differs from the latter two: (i) The technical
permits translation without residue, but the latter two don’t-the
stylized especially so. (ii) Individual variation in the way in which
a sender expresses himself and in which receiver is impressed is freely
accepted by all non-technical communication and is indeed the rule
in stylized communication. Such variation is sheer distraction in
technical communication. (iii) If we examine the relation between
the interpretation of an expression in the one hand and the context
on the other, we notice two things. First, the context may be either
textual or situational. The textual context then operates within the
linguistic code or system governing the text. Thus, the expression
solution is interpretable as the process
if the word rapid
precedes in the text and as the resulting mixture if the word gaseous precedes
in the text, the chemical terminology in English being what it is.
The situational context operates within the communicative framework
imposed on the situation. Thus the expression pressing the suit
is interpretable legally in some communicative situations and sartorially
in other communicative situations. Secondly, the interpretation of
an expression may be function of the context in hand or of the context
in which the expression has appeared on previous occasions. In the
former case we describe the interpretation as context-rich as opposed
to context-poor. Thus, the interpretation of solution and pressing the suit
as just exhibit context-dependence. On the other hand to sneeze or not sneeze will
strike one as humorous just in so far as the context-enrichment by
the allusion to hamlet’s to
be or not to be is operative. Coming back to our triad
after this little excursion into semiotic theory, we may point out
that technical minimizes dependence on or enrichment from the textual
contexts. The only textual context that is really permitted to affect
the interpretation of a technical expression is the defining context
of a definition or a convention or a postulate. But this is context-dependence
and context-enrichment of a very special sort. We shall have occasion
to bring in the situational context at a later point. (iv) Finally,
the extension or range of a technical expression is restricted to
the specialized field or subject-matter. The latter two place no such
a prior restriction, especially the ordinary language use.
Next, we can locate the
ways in which the stylized differs from the former two:(i) The stylized
excludes any translation without residue, but the former two don’t
the technical indeed demands it. (ii) The relation between the signant
(Saussurè s significant or Hjelmslev΄s expression) and the signate
(Saussrès signifiè or Hjelmslev΄s content) may be variously visualized.
In the former two’ the signant is seen to be merely as a means to
an end, namely communicating the signate. Consequently, there is a
certain indifference to the way a thing is said so long as it is said;
style doesn’t count for much; paraphrasing is freely possible, especially
with ordinary language use. Such is not quite the case with the stylized,
especially the poetic. The signant is not wholly separable from the
signate, the means becomes integral to the end. Consequently, style
is not merely utilitarian. (iii) As already seen, the stylized thrives
on dependence on and enrichment from the textual context. This gives
ample scope for and indeed implies need of hermeneutic activity. Such
is not the case with the former two: one may read as one runs, so
to say. (iv) Finally, the intension of an expression is restricted
in respect of the technical and the ordinary by the universe of discourse
as delimited by the specialized interest or the practical purpose
in hand. Such is not quite the case with the stylized, especially
the poetic. The poet is entitled to all the meaning the reader can
get out of the poem, as Robert Frost reminds us. The reverberations
of meaning continue for a long time, if they cease at all.
Next, we can locate the
ways in which the ordinary differs from the two extremes, extremes
that meet, as it were: (i) The ordinary language use muddles through,
as already seen. The other two demand from the sender and even the
receiver a certain willing suspension of casualness, a readiness to
put in special effort and to put up with special difficulties, a certain
initiation into the conventions of the technical specialty or the
poetic craft, as case may be. (ii) Naturally, technical and the stylized
not only tend to exploit the capacity of the natural language to its
fullest but also occasionally tax it. The ordinary language use, on
the other hand, is content to stay within the limits of what is normally
effable and content not to take too many liberties with the language
in hand. (iii) The density of communication effected tends to be rather
low for the ordinary which tolerates a good deal of tautology, circumlocution,
or simple repetition. The other two shirk these on the whole and maintain
a high density of communication. This often gives scope for exegetic
activity. (iv) The ordinary language use has what Waismann (1952)
has called open texture, a certain indeterminateness-the technical
effects this determinateness through prior codification, prior understanding
between the interlocutors whether through linguistic custom or through
linguistic contract; the stylized effects this determinateness through
generating its own code such that the poem is, so to say, the only
text admissible within its highly determinate grammar. (v) Finally,
the operation of the situational context is maximal in the ordinary
language-use-whether by way of context-dependence or context-enrichment
of its interpretation. Situation-ally deictic-expressions like here, now, tomorrow, I,
you, the
garden, are used liberally, and they really point a finger
at the situation at hand. Especially, when the interlocutors share
a situation over a length of time as in a family or a working group,
the signant can be pared down with a lot of things being left understood
as recoverable from the situation. Such is not the case with the other
two. In the technical the situational context is minimally operative.
In the stylized the deictic impact of the text tends to be fictional-it
gives local habitation and a name to a world of make-believe. The
apparent situational context is really textual in nature; in Susanne
Langer’s sense of virtual.
TABLE
1: The Three Contrasting Manners of Language Use
|
Distinctive feature
of
Language used
|
Technical
Language
use
|
Ordinary
Language
use
|
Stylized
|
|
Permitting Translation
without residue
|
max
|
med.
|
min.
|
|
Individual variation
expression and impression
|
min..
|
med.
|
max.
|
|
Dependence on and
enrichment from textual context
|
min.
|
med.
|
max
|
|
Restriction to some
specialized field or subject matter
|
max.
|
min.
|
med.
|
|
Excluding translation
with residue
|
min.
|
med.
|
max.
|
|
Availability of
a paraphrase
|
med.
|
max.
|
min.
|
|
Scope and need for
hermeneutic activity
|
med.
|
min.
|
max.
|
|
Delimiting intention
by the matter in hand or universe of discourse
|
med.
|
max.
|
min.
|
|
Need for a willing
suspension of casualness
|
max
|
min.
|
med.
|
|
Exploiting the capacity
of the natural language
|
max
|
min.
|
max.
|
|
Density of communication
and consequent scope for exegetic activity
|
max.
|
min.
|
max.
|
|
Open texture and
indetermination of code
|
min.
|
max.
|
min.
|
|
Dependence on and
enrichment from situational context
|
min.
|
max.
|
min.
|
|
Relationship between
the meaning of the whole text and the respective meaning of
its parts
|
the
whole meaning wholly a
simple
function of the parts
|
quite
variable
|
the
whole meaning is richer than the sum of the parts
|
We are
now in a position to locate ways in which the three manners of using
language differ each from the other. This can be seen in the relationship
between the meaning of the whole text and the respective meanings
of the parts. Ideally, the meaning of a technical text is wholly a
function of the constituent expressions and syntactic constructions.
The meaning of a stylized whole is never wholly a function of its
parts-the whole is typically more than the sum or product of its parts,
so to say. The meaning of an ordinary text shows no such clear relationship
with the meanings of its parts. The whole may even be, as it were,
even less than the sum of its parts. Thus not so much as does not usually mean the
same as the technical not
equal to as one may be led to expect; conversationally
it tends to mean less than and exclude less than and
exclude the possibility more than.
The peculiar features of technical names
and terms then flow from the peculiar features of the technical manner
of using language as distinct from the ordinary and stylized manners
of using language. Before we look at these features of technical names
and terms it will be useful if not necessary to look at the difference
between technical names and technical terms or, what comes to the
same thing, between technical nomenclature and technical terminology.
2.
In order to give a rough idea of the sort of distinction that is involved
it may be useful to exemplify technical names and technical terms
from some specialized field, say, chemistry. Expressions such as oxygen, carbon dioxide,
Sulphate,
ammonium2 are technical names and together constitute
the technical nomenclature of chemistry. On the other hand expressions
such as atom, molecule, react, reaction, reagent, acid,
catalyst, valence are technical terms and together constitute the technical terminology
of chemistry. It is interesting that persons writing about chemistry
in Indian languages usually simply borrow the technical names directly
from English and proceed to write of āksijan x (oxygen)x kārban x
(carbon) and so forth, while they would much rather borrow the technical
terms from English through translation and proceed to write, say,
of aṇu, reṇu, kī pratikriyā honā, pratikriyā,
and so forth. (Hindi for atom, molecule, react, reaction) As shall observe later, there
are good semiotic reasons for this discrimination.
As with
all linguistic expressions, the signant of that technical expression
is not direct but mediated. Let us call this point of mediation the
sign-focus of that expression. At the moment we are not concerned
with the way the sign-focus is hitched on to the rest of the text
(for example, as a subject or an object) or the rest of the stock
of expressions in the language (for example, as a verb, as a homonym).
Nor are we concerned with the way the signant is hitched on to the
sign-focus-that is to say, we are not concerned with expression-form.
We are rather concerned with the way the sign-focus is hitched on
to the signate–that is to say, we are concerned with content-from,.
In short we are concerned with the second half of the semiotic chain
constituted by the following five elements in that order:
a) the terminal sign-ant (heard or seen by the
receiver, uttered or written by the sender);
(b)
the expression –form (recognized by the receiver; rendered by the
sender);
(c)
the sign-focus (placed at such a point that the links a-b and b-c
are relatively independent of the links c-d and d-e);
(d)
the content –form (comprehended by the receiver; formulated by the
sender);
(e)
the terminal sign-ate (attended to by the receiver; entertained by
the sender).
When we say that a certain expression has
a technical sense, we are saying that its content-form serves technical
ends, the ends of the technical manner of using language. Again, as
with most linguistic expressions, the sense or content-form of a technical
expression is twofold in character-it consists of (d1) a presentation
of some kind and (d2) a range of some kind.
The link of sense (c-d), in other words, is really a set of
two links in a parallel fashion- the link of intension (c-d) and the
link of extension (c-d2). The link between the content-form and the
terminal sign-ate is the link of reference (d-e), whether intentional
(d1-e) or extensional (d2-e).
(d1)
(a)--------(b)-------------(c)--------- -----------(e)
d2)
In the
semiotic chain of a linguistic expression, the link between (c) and
(d) is intentional sense and that between (c) and (d2) is extensional
sense. The link between (d1) and (e) is intentional
reference and that between (d2) and (e) is extensional reference.
A sample would be:
<flower
scented, etc>
the
flower
/ləuzs
/-----/rōz/---- rose
as ----------
entry
in the
vocabulary
and plant
out there
the genus
Rosa with
species
and
breed;
their
flowers.
The
proper functioning of any sign requires a certain fit between the
signant and the sign-ate. With
mediated signs such as linguistic expressions the fit that is important
to us here is the fit between the sign-focus and the terminal sign-ate. We describe a good fit either by saying that the terminal sign-ate
satisfies the sign-focus (say, the thing satisfies the word) or by
saying that the sign-focus is appositely applicable to the terminal
signage (say, word is appositely applicable to the thing). Since content-form( say, sense of the word consisting of the presentation
or the range associated with the word) intervenes the sign-focus and
the terminal sign-ate, we are in a position to add the following details
to the description of the fit:
(i)
The terminal sign-ate satisfies the sign-focus if and only if either
the terminal sign-ate conforms to the presentation or the terminal
sign-ate falls within the range (say, the thing satisfies the word
if and only if either the thing conforms to the presentation or the
thing falls within the range). (ii) The sign-focus appositely applies to
the terminal sign-ate or the range covers the terminal sign-ate (say,
the word appositely applies to the thing if and only if either the
presentation appropriately displays the thing or the range covers
the thing).
These
detailed descriptions of the fir between the sign-focus and the terminal
sign-ate serve to bring out that this fit calls for a certain harmony
between the presentation and the range of any sign-focus-or, what
comes to the same thing a certain harmony between intentional reference
and extensional reference and extensional reference of the sign-focus.
How is this harmony ensured?
This harmony is to be
ensured in either of two ways. Linguistic
expressions differ as to the favored way of ensuring the harmony between
intentional reference and extensional reference. The sign-focus may be either extension-oriented or intension –oriented
(say, the linguistic expression may be either a name or a term).
(i)
A sign-focus is extension-oriented if and only if a good fit for intentional
reference presupposes a good fit for extensional reference (say, a
word is a name if and only if a good display of a thing presupposes
a good coverage of that thing).
(ii)
A sign-focus is intension –oriented if and only if a good fit for
extensional reference presupposes a good fit for intentional reference
(say, a word is a term if and only if a good coverage of a thing presupposes
a good display of that thing).
You have all heard of
the young princess who drew a picture displaying the young man she
wanted to marry and the king΄s emissaries who looked for a man
that will conform to the picture.
The picture in the story is somewhat like a word that is a
term. If the proposed man fails to conform, he has to go but the picture
stands. And then there is the other story in which the shy prince
sends his picture to the princess in the hope of marrying her.
When the princess actually sees the prince, she says the picture
fails to do justice to his handsome looks. The picture has to go but she has found the
prince all right. The picture in this latter story is somewhat like
a word that is a name.
Expressions
like horse
neighs are names—when one hears or utters these names, one
sees a horse or hears a neighing.
Dictionaries typically fail to do justice to their presentation
or intentional sense. Horse gets glossed as an animal with four
legs, a tail, and a mane΄ which so called definition actually
fits a lion also. The dictionary
that is content with billing a horse as a kind of animals is at least
more honest. The fact of the matter is that the words horse and neighs are actually
more like proper names than traditional grammar and logic may care
to admit. Substituting ΄Equus caballus ΄for΄
kind of animal΄ is not much of an improvement in that Equus caballus is
as much a name as
horse or Bucephalus
or as oxygen
or carbon or gram or vitamin
B12 is. The zoologist
could certainly offer a presentation that displays a horse better,
that is, a better portrait of a horse, but only after the name horse or equus caballus has served to establish the
range to be considered.
In contrast
bird, flew, and similar expressions are terms. Even a layman may wonder
whether a bat is a bird or not. If
he decides to withhold the expression bird from a bat, he ay even
offer reasons that are perfectly respectable—only his reasons will
be cruder than the zoologist’s reasons for withholding Avis
from a bat. There may even
be a debate as to whether the bat’s mode of locomotion is properly
described by the word flew or by the word glided.
These are all terms as are reaction, acid, the centre of the earth, and molecule. One may well raise the question whether a crystal
is properly described as a single molecule
Being
a name and being a term are two favoured ways of ensuring harmony
between presentation and range. Actually,
in a given communication situation an expression that normally operates
as a term may be used as a term or an expression that normally operates
as term may be used name. If this shift takes place persistently,
a historical change may occur—a name may become a term or a term may
become a name. Consider the well-known scene in Bhavabhūtí’s
Uttara-rāmacaritam Where the young pupils in
Vālmīkis’ā shrama who have never seen a horse come to see Rāma΄s
horse
and ask in wonderment whether this strange animal may indeed be what
they call a horse. This is
a cause for amusement precisely because what is ordinarily a name
is here being used like a term. As
D.N.S. Bhat has very perceptively pointed out, in the degenerate period
of classical Sanskrit what started out as rather insightful terms
often ended up as mere names. I have seen the same tragedy overtake many
terms in English as used in an Indian English -medium classroom. So much for names and terms.
We shall now move on to a consideration
of technical names and technical terms3 Early in our discussion we
stressed the tidiness of the technical manner of using a language
as opposed to the muddle in the ordinary manner and to the richness
in the stylized manner. That
technical language is tidy is a bit of an exaggeration in the case
of a developing science. What Freud has to say (1915-1925: 4.60-1.
cited in Frenkel-Brunswick 1956: 98-9) is very revealing about technical
terms in a science –concepts defined in science are:
‘determined by the important relations...
to the empirical material ...we seem to divine before we can clearly
recognize and demonstrate them... Progressively we must modify these
concepts so that they become widely applicable and at the same time
consistent logically,, Then, indeed, it may be time to immure them
in definitions ..) which in turn are) constantly being altered in
their content.’
Technical terms in a theoretical
discipline are enmeshed in a theory, Let us go back to the term regular
tetrahedron. Now tetra –is the word element for ‘four’ and
there is nothing in English morphology to prevent us from coining
terms like trihedron, penta-hedron. and so forth, But actually tetra –can be replaced in the context
regular-hedron by exactly four other numeral elements hexa-,
octa,- duodeca-, and icosa
(six eight, twelve, and twenty) besides of course poly- in the terminology of solid
geometry. The definitions
of terms are not merely meshed with each other; they are meshed in
with the terms and ultimately the postulates of theory. This is especially
true of the more basic terms of a science.
They or rather the presentations associated with them are theory
–laden. To fully grasp the sense of any one of the
terms ld. Ego Super go is not merely to grasp
the sense of the other two but also to grasp the whole theory of Freud. Freud is giving us a salutary reminder that
in the formative period of the development of a theory, in the informal
shoptalk phase so to say, the scientists may be hard put to it if
called upon to spell out the presentation associated with the basic
theory-laden terms in the shape of tidy definitions or even postulates.
It is entirely possible that in this period they may actually
have a clearer notion of the range of application of these terms. Never the-less they are terms and not names.
Eventually the theory-laden presentations will control the
range. Linguists have long
used the terms marked and unmarked
before
any of them sought to clarify the presentations associated with them.
In case of a conflict between these clarifications of intentional
sense and the earlier range of use, the earlier use will stand corrected.
Of course one must discriminate terms that are genuinely pregnant
with a theory in the process of articulation from the mere weasel
words (so-called in allusion to the habit of weasels of ruining an
egg by sucking its contents out).
As the economist Machlup mockingly points out (1958-1963: 89-90),
the word ‘structure’ works in some ‘educated’ circles just as the
phrase’ you know what I mean’ works among less literate people.
To persuade you that a certain measure is needed you are told
that’ structure’ makes it absolutely indispensable, and that the ΄structural
imbalance΄ cannot be coped with in any other way;- surely, you
understand, don’t you? This
is not the temporary untidiness of a building site, but the sloppiness
of mind using language as a means of concealing the absence of thought.
This last description is also appositely applicable for a somewhat
different reason to the ‘sociologese’ pilloried by Sir Ernest Gowers
in his revision (1965) of H.W. Fowler’s A Dictionary
of Modern
English usage (1926).
What about the extension-oriented technical names of science liked
oxygen carbon, Felis,
Acinonyx jubatus
(the cheetah,) Thai (the Siamese language)? They
are also subject to change in the course of the development of the
science concerned. To begin
with, the taxonomies are under continual revision.
The cheetah was once named Felis jubatus,
now it is placed in a genus by itself.
Thus the range of Felis contracts and the range of jubatus now falls within anew
genus for which a new name Acinonyx is coined. Thail is no longer considered to
be a member of the Sino-Tibetan language family; now it is considered
to be a member of the Thai-Kadai language family. What is more interesting
is that the associated presentation of a technical name of science
is also liable to change. Oxygen
was so named because it was acid-generating, now all that is merely
irrelevant etymology, oxygen is now defined as the element with the
atomic number 16. The presentation has now a theoretical basis. Biology has not reached the stage where Equus-caballus
could be similarly defined in terms of some appropriate genetic formula. But biology has certainly reached the stage
when Aves (birds) is no longer a terms as bird is to the layman but
merely a name for a branch of the taxonomic tree.
That some ‘birds’ don’t fly does not disturb the biologist
they are Aves all right. The term quadruped remains, but it has no longer
the importance it once had in the classification of animals. All theory-laden.
technical expressions are terms, but not all technical terms are theory-laden.
Names are of course innocent of theory; at best, as in the
case of oxygen
when
equipped with the atomic number and pigeon-holed in the periodic table,
the pigeon-hole or range of which they are arbitrary labels has acquired
a theory-governed terms, in this case element with the atomic number
sixteen. So borrowing oxygen directly and borrowing molecule through translation makes
good philosophical sense no less than good educational sense- in either
case good semiotic sense.
3. Nomenclatures and terminologies are human artifacts and so
liable to be humanly imperfect. Especially
so, since they appear as customary or minimally planned modifications
of the vocabularies of the all too imperfect and messy natural languages.
Short of creating whole cloth a new vocabulary a la Panini
with his luṭ and ḍu (the term for the so called
First Future and the market accompanying the lexical entry for the
verb Kr ‘do’ conveying certain morphological ‘rule features’ or a
new graphology a la Western musical notation or of adapting and extending
non-linguistic symbolisms like mathematics and mathematical logic,
we have to fallback upon natural language.
This is not an unmixed curse as we have just seen.
Immuring names and terms in tidy enumerations or definitions
may be premature. Sciences and even games like cricket are open
to change. Finally, if the epistemology of the later Wittgenstein
is valid, there may be no-escape-really from the anchoring of technical
language in natural language in its ordinary use. So we have top out
wit the nuisance. The nuisance
is twofold. First, there is interfering learning transfer from ordinary
language to technical language. When a mathematician calls a straight
line a rather uninteresting curve, the beginning student’s breath
is taken away and when a beginning student mixes up force and power,
his physics teacher’s patience wears a little thinner.
Secondly, the links in the semiotic chain are all made awry—that
is to say, the links a –b, b-c, c-d, d-e, as you may recall.
What Gunter (1972:18) has to say about natural languages is
very pertinent:
If we take some synchronic state of the language-from any period
of that history whatever-it gives the impression of both order and
disorder at the same time. Begin
at some point in that state and there will be orderly extension of
form and meaning out word from that point, but the order always ends
in disorder. There is order in parts but not in the whole. In this respect the system is like amass of
the crystals of some mineral: each crystal seems to have grown in
accord with some plan, but there is no overall plan that relates each
crystal to the others. Or at least that overarching plan is not visible
to us. What we seem to see is a disorderly collection
of orders.
Let us take a relatively simple
example affecting the link between expression-form and sign-focus(the
b-c link). Let us take a textual context of the following sort:
The energy is then available in the form
of----- We can study it in the branch of physics called
If we
start listing pairs of terms that can appear in the two slots, we
end up like this:
light- optics
sound:
acoustics
heat:
*thermics ? no! heat
magnetism:
*magnetics? no! magnetism
electricity:
*electrics? no! electricity
If we had started listing from the other en, it would
have perhaps been frustrating
in a slightly different way:
electricity:
electricity:
magnestism:
magnestism:
heat: heat
sound:
sound may be also
acoustics
light: light,
may be also optics
The allosemy (one sign –focus, two content-form or senses)
heat-heat as plenty of precedent of in English (history: history;
grammar; grammar) and is based on metonym my of some sort, but
that does not make it any the less silly; the thermos and grammaticism
would have been oh so comfortingly tidy and clear- headed.
Clear headed ness is even more important than tidiness –it
is really frustrating to have to wonder we there the influence of
English grammar on Marathi grammar’ has to do say, with Lindsay Murrary’s
influence on Dodoba Panduranga or Alexander Bain’s on G.G. Agora or,
say , with the modelling of rāṇī Vikturiyā
after Queen Victoria
rather than the more traditional Vickturiyā rāṇī And
of course there are people capable of making a thorough job of muddling
between the two interpretations –there is no muddling through for
them but just plain muddling.
Amore
subtle example (affecting the c-d link) may be taken from traditional
logic namely, the terms for the three laws of thought
The law of identity:
identity
The law of contradicion:
contradiction
The law of excluded middle: exclusion of middle
Eventually logicians realized
that this will not do that the second law does not demand contradiction
but excluded it. So the second
law was redesign Ted as the law of non contradiction. But such is the pull of tradition that a certain teacher of
logic of kept calling it the law of contra dictation better called
the law non contradiction! Incidentally the third law could rather
be called the law of exclusion of middle.
Baring
these consideration in mind we shall do propose to ourselves certain
canons of technical vocabulary, which is inclusive, both of technical
names and of technical terms. What
I propose to do hear is to formulate without any discussion and with
minimal illustration a set of 19 such cannons Let first merely list
cannons and indicate their grouping ad grading.
The canons fall into two broad groups.
The fifteen canons are arranged in a sequence and designed
two ensure smooth communicative flow in either direction along the
semiotic chain. The listener
or reader proceeds from the terminal signal through the sign –focus
to the terminal signage through the sign –focus to the terminal signant. In the case of conflict between to cannons,
the earlier takes residence while these 15 cannons with their internal
sub-groups are concerned with smooth communication as it concerns
a single specialty, the remaining 4 cannons set out the limits on
ways of the facilitating communication between two specialties. The cannons list out follows.
- Canons for ensuring smooth communication within a specialty
A.
Smooth linkage between terminal signates and content-forms
a.(1)
code-worthiness of the subject matter
(2)
Exhaustive reference to the subject matter
(1)
Relevant reference to the subject matter
b. Cod-ability
of reference
(2)
(3)Amenability to testing referential fit
(4)Amenability
to calibration
B.
Smooth linkage between expression forms and content-forms mediated
by the sign-focus
a.
Efficacy of encoding and decoding
(5)
Avoidance of nonfunctional multivalence
(6)
Avoidance of nonfunctional equivalence
(7)
Easy recovery of content from expression
(8)
Easy recovery of expression from content
b.
Learn ability of code
(9)
Transcendence of natural language
(10)
Versatility
(11)
