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                     At the global level, we have several sociolinguistic 
                    models available. I have already briefly talked about the one 
                    developed by Labov (1966) and Trudgill (1974); I have also indicated 
                    the limitations of this variability paradigm. Though work in 
                    this framework does go a long way in trying to capture diachronic 
                    change in synchronic, across the generations, linguistic analysis, 
                    it does not illuminate the power structures obtaining in a speech 
                    community. In fact, most of these studies assume that norms 
                    of social and linguistic behaviour which acquire a particularly 
                    oppressive and exploitative character over time emerge as normal 
                    workings of society and that there is a general consensus about 
                    their relative hierarchy (see e.g. Labov 1966:64). The work 
                    done by Fishman (1972, 1978) and his followers offers an alternative 
                    framework in terms of language maintenance and language shift 
                    and domain analysis. Instead of language structure, it focuses 
                    on language use in different domains but once again in terms 
                    of a theory of peaceful and collective consensus (cf. William 
                    1992). The question of how language is used in sustaining and 
                    manipulating power relations is not discussed. In Agnihotri 
                    (2000) (in the St. Petersburg Paper to appear in the Sage Yearbook 
                    2001), I tried to show how some of the sociolinguistic studies 
                    (e.g. Agnihotri 1979, Mukherjee 1980, Satyanath 1982) constitute 
                    a counterpoint to these models and argued that the sociolinguist's 
                    faith in the theory of consensus is almost unethical. Another 
                    proposal comes from Bernstein (1971-75) who did raise the questions 
                    of differential language socialization. He made a distinction 
                    between the elaborated and restricted code, the former being 
                    associated with the middle class and the latter with the lower 
                    class. He argued that social class determines linguistic structure, 
                    which in turn reproduces social structure. Middle class is the 
                    ideal and therefore its language must be elaborated and the 
                    lower classes, through remedial teaching, must imitate the behaviour 
                    of the middle class. This may also help them to overcome their 
                    cognitive deficits. Bernstein's deficit hypothesis is an insult 
                    to human intelligence and linguistic competence. This framework 
                    forces you to characterize the middle class speech positively 
                    and then makes you look for the absence of those features in 
                    the lower class speech. His work reminds one of the far more 
                    important work of Sapir and Whorf and several other scholars 
                    including Hymes, Gumperz, Levinson, Lucy, and Brown who have 
                    since worked on the theory of relativity. Sapir (1949:162) felt 
                  that people were at the mercy of their language:  | 
               
               
                     No 
                      two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered 
                      as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which 
                      different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the 
                      same world with different labels attached.   | 
               
               
                     Later Whorf (1956:221) pointed out that users 
                    of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars 
                    toward different types of observations and different evaluation 
                    of extremely similar acts of observation. In other words, meanings 
                    you construct depend on your frames of reference and these frames 
                    it seems are given a priori by your language. Once again we 
                    end up with a hopelessly fatalistic position - one which first 
                    ignores the power relations in society and which does not even 
                    hint at a way out of this determinism. It is only in some recent 
                    work (see e.g. Gumperz and Levinson 1996; studies cited in Foley 
                    1997) that scholars of the relativity model are beginning to 
                    realize that meanings may actually be negotiated in the communicative 
                    practices of a society and interpretations of those negotiations 
                  may not be possible without ideological considerations.  | 
               
               
                     As I (Agnihotri 1998, 2000) have argued elsewhere, 
                    most of these approaches to the relationship between language 
                    and society take the existence of a language and 'a society' 
                    or a culture as given - well organized systems in place, conceived 
                    and functioning in an ideologically neutral space. The conflicts 
                    that are an essential part of these systems and regulate their 
                    maintenance and change are often ignored. That's why when such 
                    scholars are confronted with systems that are fluid and volatile, 
                    their efforts to fit them into prefabricated slots give way. 
                    Neat formulations of linguistic systems get into trouble when 
                    they are confronted with pidgins, creoles or mixed codes. When 
                    he was confronted with mind-boggling alternation of languages, 
                  Labov (1971:457) said:  | 
               
               
                     So 
                      far no one has been able to show that such rapid alternation 
                      is governed by any systematic rules or constraints and we 
                      must therefore describe it as the irregular mixture of two 
                      distinct systems.   | 
               
               
                     First of all, I don't think it is a question 
                    of two systems; in a stretch of speech several so-called language-systems 
                    may be involved. Secondly, I don't think any system, however, 
                    codified and crystallized, is really distinct. There are always 
                    grey areas. In spite of Labov's warning to the contrary the 
                    search for constraints on mixing languages has continued. I 
                    am not suggesting that there are no constraints; I am simply 
                    saying that all individuals in all contexts function under the 
                    same universal constraints. If we, for example, maintain that 
                    'CVCV' is a universal structural pattern, we will find all linguistic 
                    behaviour, be it in highly codified standardized languages or 
                    in pidgins, creoles or mixed codes, obeying that pattern of 
                    an alternation of consonantal and vocalic sounds. Again, if 
                    we maintain that it is a part of the Universal Grammar that 
                    languages will divide their lexical stock into lexical and grammatical 
                    categories and that, lexical categories such as nouns, verbs 
                    and adjectives can have comparable symmetrical expansions; we 
                    should expect to find this phenomenon in all human speech. When 
                    you begin to examine mixed codes from the point of view of two 
                    independent discrete systems, you get into a process of almost 
                    arbitrarily assigning segments to a 'matrix' and an 'embedded' 
                    language, the hypothesis being that every constituent must belong 
                    to an a priori given language (see e.g. Kachru 1975; Disciullo, 
                    Muysken and Singh 1986; Pfaff 1979, Sankoff and Poplack 1981; 
                  Sankoff, Poplack and Vanniarajan 1991 among others).  | 
               
               
                     Recent research on mixed codes has centred around 
                    'free morpheme constraint' and the 'equivalence constraint'. 
                    The former forbids the mixed code users to inflect the words 
                    of one language with the morphology of another, something most 
                    fluent mixed code users do all the time. It is possible, as 
                    Singh (2000) has argued, that before an inflectional morpheme 
                    is really isolated, a set of words with inflections glued on 
                    must, first be borrowed. Yet we must accept, that for a multilingual, 
                    whose language proficiency travels along a continuum varying 
                    from native like control to minimal incipient competence in 
                    some varieties, inflectional morphemes float across the linguistic 
                    spectrum. The essence of the equivalence constraint is that 
                    mixing can only occur in those area of grammar that are shared 
                    by both the languages, i.e., mixing should not violate the syntactic 
                  rules of either language (Kak and Agnihotri 1996).  | 
               
             
		 
		  
		    
            
					 
				 		
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